





















COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF SCU, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA
CRITICALITY AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS.














COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [


































NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-372 BASELINE [ ]
330-FM19 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
372
















RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [






















NEW [ X ]
EMU
369
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT BUT THE IOA RECOMMENDS
COMBINING 330-FMI AND FM2 TO REFLEXT THE ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO.
THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.





NASA FMEA #: 330-FM20
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 330-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH
THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE IOA DOES RECOMMEND
COMBINING NASA FAILURE MODES 330-FM3 AND -FM4 TO REFLECT THE
MISSION SCENARIO.














COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FAILURE MODES 330-FM3 AND -FM4
TO REFLECT THE COMPLETE MISSION SCENARIO. THEREFORE, A 2/IRB
CRITICALITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED.












EMU-370 BASELINE [ ]
330-FM5 NEW [ X ]
EMU
370
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN A WHICH
THE IOARECOMMENDS PASSING DUE TO "CAPABILITY" FOR TEST.
ADDITIONALLY THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING 330-FM5 AND -FM6 TO
REFLECT THE ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 330-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THE ENTIRE
MISSION SCENARIO WHICH WOULD ALSO SUGGEST COMBINING FAILURE MODES
330-FM5 AND -FM6.





NASA FMEA #: 330-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 330-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 330-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ p ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. CAUSES SHOULD BE EXPANDED
TO INCLUDE VIBRATION.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C














NASA FMEA #: 350-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FMII
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [































NEW [ X ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 350-FM13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A NEW CRITICALITY TO REFLECT THE FOLLOWING
SCENARIO. WHEN THE DISCRETE FAILS ON THE CWS DOES NOT MONITOR
FOR "HIGH OXYGEN USE RATE" AND "H20 OFF STATUS". THIS CAN
POSSIBLY COMBINE WITH AN OXYGEN LEAK AND REQUIRE EMERGENCY USE OF
THE
SOP. SOP FAILURE CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [N]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [























NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ ] [ ]













RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM18
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
IX] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM19
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [




























NEW [ X ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS CHANGING THE FAILURE MODE FROM DRIFTS LOW TO FAILS OFF
DUE TO AN ELECTRICAL OPEN.














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]










NEW [ X ]
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[P] IF] [P]
[P] [P] [P]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM22
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] C F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM23
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM24
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] IF] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILED FUNCTION IS
NOT DETECTABLE NOR IS IT AUTOMATICALLY BACKED UP.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM25
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM26
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS NOT
DETECTABLE NOR IS THE FAILED FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY BACKED UP.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM27
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ F ]
[ P ] [ F ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] C ] *
] C ]
] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM29
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ / ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS A FAILURE MODE OF THE SYSTEM BUT
RATHER AN ANOMALY. AS SUCH, THE IOA RECOMMENDS ITS DELETION FROM
THE NASA FMEA.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]







[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 350-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM30
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA DOES NOT CONSIDER THE IDENTIFIED NASA "FAILURE MODE" AS
CREDIBLE. THE IOA CONSIDERS IT APPLICABLE TO A HAZARD ANALYSIS
BUT NOT AN FMEA. THE IOA RECOMMENDS ITS DELETION FROM THE NASA
FMEA.











DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCEEN B WHICH THE
IOA NOW AGREES WITH.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM32
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)





NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF THE B SCREEN BECAUSE IT IS NOT DETECTABLE
NOR IS THE FAILED FUNCTION AUTOMATICALLY BACKED UP.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM33
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]








HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /iR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM34
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [N/ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/IR] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR TO REFLECT A TWO FAILURE SCENARIO WHERE
THE IDENTIFIED FAILURE OCCURS THEREBY CAUSING LOSS OF THE "LOW
VOLTAGE ELECTRONICS" WHICH INCLUDES C02 SENSING. IF A SECOND
FAILURE (HIGH C02_ WERE TO THEN OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE
LOST.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM35
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS BUT WOULD INCLUDE
ELECTRICAL OPENS ANYWHERE ALONG THE FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT PATH.




















HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B. THE
IOA RECOMMENDS FIALURE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE THE FAILURE MODE IS
NOT DETECTABLE AND DOESN'T HAVE AUTOMATIC BACKUP FOR THE REQUIRED
FUNCTION. THE IOA THEREFORE RECOMMENDS INCLUSION IN THE CIL.





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]






















NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]














] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 350-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)







NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 351-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE A FAILED ON BITE INDICATOR CAN CREATE A QUESTION OF
SYSTEM VERACITY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. THIS IS
ALSO BASED ON THE FACT MISSION TERMINATION WILL OCCUR ONCE
DETECTED DURING A PERIODIC SEQUENCE CHECK.














BITE INDICATOR (ITEM 363)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 351-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






ALPHANUMERIC DISPLAY (ITEM 369)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA INCLUDING PARTIAL DISPLAY LOSS IN
THIS FAILURE MODE AND WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS RESULTS. HOWEVER,
THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT UPON DETECTION DURING PERIODIC STATUS
CHECK (OR TONE GENERATION) THE MISSION BE TERMINATED THEREFORE A
HARDWARE CRITICALITY OF "2". THE IOA DOES NOT SEE A SECOND
FAILURE AS CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE DUE TO TONE AVAILABILITY AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF A SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE FAILURE.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 351-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [





















NEW [ X ]
ALITY REDUND_CY SCREENS
_GHT
FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
3 ] [ ] [ ] [ 3
3 ] [ 3 [ ] [ ]




•IS: (If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
)N RATIONALE : (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE











NASA FMEA #: 360-FMI, FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 360-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
N_A [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 360-FM3, FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]











COLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]











VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 360-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






VOLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY DUE TO AVAILABILITY OF
SECOND VOLUME CONTROL CHANNEL AND TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY WITH
NASA FMEA 360-FM2.





NASA FMEA #: 361-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO CAN INCLUDE EVA OPERATIONS ON THE DEEP SPACE
SIDE OF THE EARTH WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LUNAR REFLECTION. PAYLOAD
BAY LIGHTING, ALTHOUGH AVAILABLE, CANNOT ENSURE
READABILITY. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND
INCLUSION IN THE CIL. THIS WILL ACCOUNT FOR MISSION TIMELINE
IMPACTS RESULTING FROM FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.














DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOGNIZES THE INCORPORATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IN THE
NASA FMEA 361-FMI; HOWEVER, FOR THE SAME REASONS STATED IN IOA
ASSESSMENT ID EMU-396 THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 361-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA BELIEVES THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO CAN INCLUDE EVA OPERATIONS ON THE DEEP SPACE
SIDE OF THE EARTH WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LUNAR REFLECTION. PAYLOAD
BAY LIGHTING, ALTHOUGH AVAILABLE, CANNOT ENSURE
THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL. THIS WILL ACCOUNT FOR MISSION TIMELINE IMPACTS
RESULTING FROM FINDING AN ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.














DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ NA]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
C ]














DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




FOR THE WORST CASE WHERE THE DISPLAY INTENSITY IS AT ITS LOWEST
VALUE, THE DISPLAY COULD BE UNREADABLE FOR THE EVA MISSION. IF
THIS WERE TO OCCUR, THE MISSION TIMELINE COULD BE IMPACTED BY THE
CREWPERSON ATTEMPTING TO FIND AN ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.
THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A CRITICALITY OF 2/2.











NEW [ X ]
EMU
736
DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] .
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE C / ] [ ] C ] C ] -[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA BELIEVES THE WORST CASE SCENARIO CAN
INCLUDE EVA OPERATIONS ON THE DEEP SPACE SIDE OF THE EARTH
WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT LUNAR REFLECT. PAYLOAD BAY LIGHTING CANNOT
ENSURE READABILITY. THEREFORE THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2
CRITICALITY AND INCLUSION IN THE CIL. THIS WILL ACCOUNT FOR
MISSION TIMELINE IMPACTS RESULTING FROM EFFORTS TO FIND AN
ACCEPTABLE LIGHT SOURCE.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FMI
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE CAUSES
SHOULD BE REVISED TO BE MORE COMPREHENSIVE.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS. HOWEVER, THE CAUSES
SHOULD BE REVISED TO BE MORE COMPREHENSIVE.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTORSWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ NA]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS A "FAIL OPERATIONAL" FAILURE FOR MODE A
AND BECAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANCY DOES NOT FURTHER IMPACT IT, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. THE IOAAND THE NASA SCREEN
ASSIGNMENTS ARE IN AGP_EMENT.














EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT OF CAUSES.














EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA. THE IOA ALSO
RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT OF CAUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [NA] [
[P] [P] [NA] [
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS "FAIL OPERATIONAL" FOR MODE B AND BECAUSE
FURTHER LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS NO IMPACT TO MODE B, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY. THE IOA AND THE NASA SCREENS ARE
IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT OF CAUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN B
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSIGNMENT.
ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT
OF CAUSES.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B WHICH
THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH.





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT FOR SCREEN B;
REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA FINDING.














EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
CIL
ITEM
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA] [ X ] *
[P] [P] [NA] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE FAILURE IS "FAIL OPERATIONAL" AND BECAUSE FURTHER
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IS NO IMPACT TO BACKUP MODE, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 3/3 CRITICALITY.














EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 362-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






EVC SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 362)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT. THE IOA NOW
CONCURS WITH THE NASA SCREEN B.





NASA FMEA #: 364-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FMI0
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT AND THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT.














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-417A BASELINE [ ]
364-FMII NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
417




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 364-FM12
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[X]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM13
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM14
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM15
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-414A BASELINE [ ]
364-FM16 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
414
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 364-FM17
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[p] IF] [P]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ N ] [ ]
[ X ] *
IX]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY DUE TO MISSION TERMINATION
IMPACT AND BECAUSE THE OTHER FAILURES WHICH CAN CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE ARE NOT REDUNDANT IN NATURE OR FUNCTION AND THEREFORE, PER
22206, CANNOT BE EMPLOYED TO UPGRADE FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM18
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-425 BASELINE [ ]
364-FM19 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
425




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 364-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
421




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-420A BASELINE [ ]
364-FM6 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
420




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [























NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
421




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 364-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /1R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 364-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






POWER MODE SELECTOR SWITCH (ITEM 364)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 365-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ P ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 365-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)





NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECO_ENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] IF]























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-436
365-FM3
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
436




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [































HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOGNIZES THE INCORPORATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE IN NASA
FMEA 365-FM4; HOWEVER, THE IOA EFFECTS DIFFER. THE IOA BELIEVES
THE VOX POSITION COULD BE LOST (IT IS NORMALLY IN OPEN POSITION)
AND WOULD REQUIRE LOSS OF A REDUNDANT FUNCTION (E.G., PTT)
TO CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.














PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]














PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ p ] [ F ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 365-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 365-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 3/2R CRITICALITY TO REFLECT MISSION IMPACT
WITH LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FURTHER REVIEW ALSO INDICATES THE
SCREEN B SHOULD BE PASSED. ADDITIONALLY, A FAILURE SUCH AS THIS
ON THE IMPACTED LINE SHOULD REFLECT THE WORST CASE FOR THE
FAILURE ON ALL OF THE OUTPUTS (PTT MOMENTARY, VOX, OR VOX
DISABLE). ALSO, THE IOA NOW RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B.





NASA FMEA #: 365-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT ON THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.














PUSH-TO-TALK SWITCH (ITEM 365)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]





RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ D ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT. A 3/2R CRITICALITY IS
RECOMMENDED DUE TO CAPABILITY OF CREWPERSON TO SWITCH TO A
REDUNDANT COMMUNICATIONS POSITION (E.G. VOX).














NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
EMU-444
366-FMI
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
444




NEW [ X ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 366-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)





NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [




















FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA ACCEPTS THE NASA SCREEN B ASSIGNMENT DUE TO CAPABILITY TO
RESPOND AND IS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 366-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, FURTHER REVIEW
INDICATES THAT SUCH A FAILURE WHEN COMBINED WITH A HARD CHARGE,
AN ITEM 172 FAILURE, AND AN SOP FAILURE COULD RESULT IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF LIFE (REFERENCE NASA FMEA 366-FM6). THE IOA
THEREFORE NOW RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY. (NOTE: THIS
ASSIGNMENT ALSO ENSURES CONSISTENCY BETWEEN FAILURE MODES WITHIN
THE EMU.)





NASA FMEA #: 366-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]














FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)





NASA [ 3 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS AND SCENARIO.
C ]
C ]











FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /1R ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[P] [ ] [ ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 367-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-450
367-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
450




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 367-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA SCENARIO WOULD REQUIRE CREW ERROR
DURING EVA TO SUPPORT THE IOA CRITICALITY. THE IOA THEREFORE
AGREES WITH THE NASA FINDINGS.





NASA FMEA #: 367-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 367-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH (ITEM 367)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [F] [P]
[ X ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO ADDRESS POSSIBLE SHORT
CIRCUIT FROM OPEN TO CLOSE LINES. THIS CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF
COOLING AND CONDENSATE REMOVAL; THEREBY, REQUIRING SOP USAGE.
THE CONCURRENT LOSS OF THE SOP CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS MODIFYING THE FAILURE MODE DESCRIPTION.
THE SCREEN B HAS BEEN FURTHER REVIEWED AND IS NOW RECOMMENDED TO
BE PASSED.














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
448
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )




THE IOA AND THE NASA ANALYSIS ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 368-FMI
NASA DATA :
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ p ] [ P ] [ NA]
[ x ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 368-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT OCCURANCE OF
CONVERTER SHUTDOWN RESULTING IN MISSION TERMINATION AND, IF
COMBINED WITH A CO2 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE, POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE. ALSO, UPON FURTHER REVIEW THE IOA WOULD RECOMMEND FAILURE
OF
SCREEN B DUE TO THE FAILURE BEING NOT READILY DETECTABLE.





NASA FMEA #: 368-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ p ] [ NA]
[X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 368-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN B. THE REMAINING ANALYSIS
ARE IN AGREEMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 368-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]
















NEW [ X ]
EMU
455
CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
G. RAFFAELLI
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [







[ ] [ ]
C ] C ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 368-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNINGSWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] C ] C ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C














NASA FMEA #: 368-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]




COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]











DCM TMG (ITEM 384)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]









RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 385-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 385-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
[x]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 385-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HARD UPPER TORSO (HUT) INTERFACE (ITEM 385)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID
389).





NASA FMEA #: 385-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)





NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [




















DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ X ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]














DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




A SHORT TO GROUND WILL RESULT IN EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW FROM
VEHICLE POWER UNTIL FINALLY LOST. THEREFORE, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
A 2/2 CRITICALITY TO REFLECT MISSION IMPACTS, AND INCLUSION IN
THE CIL FOR THIS FAILURE MODE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IOA RECOMMENDS
MODIFICATION OF THIS FAILURE MODE TO SHORTS TO GROUND.





NASA FMEA #: 410-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT AND IS IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE REMAINING ANALYSIS. THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
COMBINING THE TWO FAILURE MODES, 410-FMI AND FM2, TO REFLECT THE
ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO.





NASA FMEA #: 410-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[x]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY BECAUSE THIS FAILURE MODE
WAS LIMITED TO THE EVA PHASE AND DID NOT ENCOMPASS THE ENTIRE
MISSION WHICH WOULD HAVE INDICATED A 2/2. IF DONE (REFERENCE
NASA FMEA 410-FMI) . THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS COMBINING 410-FMI
AND
FM2 INTO ONE FAILURE MODE.











NEW [ X ]
EMU
325
COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] C P ] C P ]
C ] *
C ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE NASA LIMITED THIS FAILURE TO SELECTED MISSION PHASES
THE IOA RECOMMENDS COMBINING IT WITH NASA FMEA 410-FM4 WITH A 2/2
CRITICALITY.





NASA FMEA #: 410-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA SCENARIO IS NOT AS REPRESENTATIVE THE WORST CASE AS IS
NASA; THE IOA, THEREFORE, AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY. THE
IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS COMBINING NASA FMEAs 410-FM3 AND FM4 TO
REPRESENT THE ENTIRE MISSION SCENARIO UNDER ONE ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 410-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
CX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(AD_DELETE)




THE NASA SPLIT THE MISSION PHASES FOR THIS FAILURE MODE BETWEEN
NASA FMEAs 410-FM5, FM6, AND FM7. THE IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE
COMBINED AS ONE FMEA AND WITH A 2/2 CRITICALITY. (NOTE: THE IOA
AGREED WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS IN 41-FM6).





NASA FMEA #: 410-FM6, FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS. THE IOA ALSO RECOMMENDS
COMBINING NASA FMEAs 410-FM5, FM6, AND FM7 TO REFLECT THE ENTIRE
MISSION SCENARIO FOR THIS FAILURE MODE UNDER ONE ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 410-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY WHEN THE SECOND SCU IS
NOT CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.





NASA FMEA #: 410-FM9
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ NA]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 411-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






HIGH PRESSURE OXYGEN LINE (ITEM 411)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY SINCE THE SECOND SCU IS
NOT EMPLOYED AS A REDUNDANT ITEM.





NASA FMEA #: 412A-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






PORTABLE H20 LINE (ITEM 412A)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT WHEN THE
SECOND SCU IS CONSIDERED TO BE NON-REDUNDANT.





NASA FMEA #: 412B&C-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COOLING H20 IN-LINE (ITEM 412B)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT SINCE THE
SECOND SCU IS NON-REDUNDANT.














COOLING H20 OUT-LINE (ITEM 412C)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]





COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT SINCE THE
SECOND SCU IS NON-REDUNDANT.





NASA FMEA #: 416-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BACTERIAL FILTER HOUSING (ITEM 416)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X ] *
[X]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO THE SECOND SCU
NOT BEING CONSIDERED REDUNDANT.





NASA FMEA #: 418-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 418-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX] .
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
C ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 418-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
[ ]














CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 418-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS RESULTS AND EFFECTS.
THE IOA WOULD RECOMMEND INCLUDING "CAM BINDING" AS A VIABLE
CAUSE.
ALSO,





NASA FMEA #: 418-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONDENSATE H20 REGULATOR (ITEM 418)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
SCUs.





NASA FMEA #: 419-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419 )




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS NOT REDUNDANT (BY GROUND RULE) AND
BECAUSE RECHARGE IS TERMINATED UPON DETECTION OF THIS FAILURE
MODE, THE IOARECOMMENDS A 2/2 CRITICALITY. ADDITIONALLY, THE
IOA DOES CONSIDER THE ITEM 419 CAPABLE OF GROUND TEST FOR THIS
FAILURE MODE AND THEREFORE RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN A.





NASA FMEA #: 419-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






WATER SUPPLY PRESSURE REGULATOR (ITEM 419)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS CONSIDERED NON-REDUNDANT, THE IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY OF 2/2 FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-348 BASELINE [ ]
419-FM3 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
EMU
348
















RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY AND ANALYSIS.














02 FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 420)




HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]






COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
THE SECOND SCU.





NASA FMEA #: 420-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






02 FILTER AND ORIFICE (ITEM 420)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
C ] C ] C ]
[P] CP] CP]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
SECOND SCU.





NASA FMEA #: 423-FMI, FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOAAND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREENS A
AND B; REGARDING WHICH THE IOA NOW CONCURS WITH THE NASA.





NASA FMEA #: 423-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)





NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B












RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 423-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






BACTERIA CARTRIDGE (ITEM 423)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS NOT EMPLOYED AS REDUNDANT, THE IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.











NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]





NEW [ X ]
EMU
354
POTABLE H20 FILTER (ITEM 424)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




BECAUSE THE SECOND SCU IS NOT CONSIDERED REDUNDANT, THE IOA
AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
EMU-355
424-FM2
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
355




[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [























NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-332 BASELINE [ ]
425-FMI NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
332




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 425-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC a B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ p ] [ p ]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]





NASA FMEA #: 425-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 425-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [
[P] [P] [
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 425-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ x ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO DEFINED NON-REDUNDANCY OF SCUs, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 425-FM5
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS DUE TO NON-REDUNDANCY OF
SCU.





NASA FMEA #: 425-FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 410)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ANALYSIS (DUE TO NON-REDUNDANT
SCUs).





NASA FMEA #: 425-FM7
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]




COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




DUE TO THE SECOND SCU BEING NON-REDUNDANT, THE IOA AGREES WITH
THE NASA ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 425-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]












NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [























NEW [ X ]




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
C ] C ] [ ]
[P] [P] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
























NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
A B
[ P ] C P ]
[P] [P]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 470-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]














NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
EMU
744




[ ] [ -]











RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 470-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[P] IF] [P]




RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 480-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTAMINATE CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT EXCEPT ON SCREEN A;
HOWEVER, UPON FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA SCREEN
A ASSIGNMENT.





NASA FMEA #: 480-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID-
194) .





NASA FMEA #: 480-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]







LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. (ALSO REFERENCE MDAC ID-
193).





NASA FMEA #: 480-FM3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [N] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT; HOWEVER, THE IOA
RECOMMENDS FAILURE OF SCREEN B. THIS RECOMMENDATION IS MADE
BECAUSE THE DETECTION METHOD IDENTIFIED BY THE NASA IS AN EFFECT
OF THE FAILURE HAVING OCCURED SOME PREVIOUS TIME AND IS
THEREFORE NOT READILY DETECTABLE.
















CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
G. RAFFAELLI
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ /NA ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA CONSIDERS THIS FAILURE MODE NON CREDIBLE FOR AN FMEA.
THE FAILURE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN A HAZARD ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 480-FM5, FM6
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ X] *
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
C ]














NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
NASA DATA:
EMU-192 BASELINE [ ]
480-FM7 NEW [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ]
EMU
192




[ P ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ P ]










RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [














NASA FMEA #: 480-FM8
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)




HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 1 /i ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[x] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ F ] [ ]
(AD_DELETE)




THE NASA FAILURE MODE IMPLIES THE FAILURE OF THE SOP TO MAKE UP
OXYGEN FLOW DUE TO THE SEVERITY OF THE FAILURE MODE. THE IOA
RECOMMENDS A 2/iRb, c CRITICALITY TO MORE ACCURATELY REFLECT THIS
SCENARIO AND A COMBINATION OF NASA FMEAs 480-FM7 AND FM8 UNDER
A SINGLE ANALYSIS.





NASA FMEA #: 490-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IX]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)













NASA FMEA #: 490-FMI
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]











HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[X]*
IX]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
[ ]
[ ]





NASA FMEA #: 490-FM2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 289
ITEM: BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ NA] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ p ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA RECOMMENDS A 2/IR CRITICALITY TO REFLECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF
LIFE RESULTING FROM A VIOLENT RUPTURE OF THE BATTERY DUE TO A
CONCURRENT SHORT WHICH GENERATES HYDROGEN GAS. THE IOA DOES
AGREE WITH THE NASA SCREEN ASSIGNMENTS.














NEW [ X ]




NDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ F ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [P] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT, HOWEVER, THE
IOA RECOMMENDS PASSAGE OF SCREEN B BECAUSE A DEGRADATION/FAILURE
OF BATTERY WOULD BE DETECTED AND SOP USAGE WOULD BE THE
CORRECTIVE ACTION.





NASA FMEA #: 490-FM4
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 287
ITEM: BATTERY (ITEM 490)
LEAD ANALYST: G. RAFFAELLI
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ F ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT. THE IOA AGREES WITH THE
NASA SCREEN A ASSIGNMENT.
















HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]






RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)




THE IOA AND THE NASA ARE IN AGREEMENT.
C ]
C ]
































































































PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1
PRIMARY H20 TANK 1





























































































































































































CHECK VALVE AND HOUSI
CHECK VALVE AND HOUSI




GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)
GAS TRAP (ITEM 141)


















WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)
WATER PUMP (ITEM 123C)














CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CHECK VALVE AND VENT
CHECK VALVE AND VENT





















































































































































CHECK VALVE AND VENT










RELIEF VALVE AND ORIF






CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER
CHECK VALVE AND FILTER






































































































































































































DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
DUAL MODE RELIEF VLV
































FAILS IN THE "OFF
FAILS IN THE "IV"
FAILS IN THE PRE





















































































































































SOP FILL PORT QD



































02 FILTER AND ORIFICE






























































































































































































































































































































































FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)












































FAN POWER ON CONT































































































































































HARD UPPER TORSO SHEL





























OPEN IN DC/DC CON
OPEN IN +14.2V
SHORT IN 3.8V OUT
SHORT IN +14.2V






JAM OF LOCK MECH





JAM. FAIL TO MAT










JAM OF SUN VISOR




LOSS OF PRIMARY A















































































































































FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)























LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
LOSS OF PRIMARY A







































































































































PRIMARY H20 TANK ASSY
PRIMARY WATER TANK AS
PRIMARY WATER TANK AS
SUBLIMATOR (ITEM 140)
PLSS/SOP TMG





























































OPEN IN BATT SENS






















































































































NECK RING AND VENT


















































































LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
LOOSE OR HAS HOLE






LOSS OF AXIAL RES
CHIN STRAP FAILS
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
UPPER PRIMARY EXI
LOSS OF BALL BEAR
D-12









































LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF PRIMARY A
LOSS OF REAR REST
TETHER BRACKET FR












This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
15, Analysis of the Extravehicular Mobility Unit, (28 November
1986). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of _MEA and
CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV SWITCH FAILS IN "VALVE OPEN"
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL ARCING, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONCURRENT FAILURE OF ITEM 134 CHECK VALVE WHEN MOTOR NOT
OPERATING CAN RESULT IN FLOODING OF FAN SEPARATOR AND MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










FAN SWITCH (ITEM 366)
CLIV SWITCH FAILS IN "VALVE CLOSE"













PRE-EVA : 2/ 2
EVA: 3/2R
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771887-2
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL ARCING, MATERIAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DURING PRE- AND POST-EVA A FAILED CLOSED VALVE CAN RESULT IN
INABILITY TO PERFORM LCVG CHANING. DURING EVA, A CONCURRENT
FAILURE OF THE 172 CHECK VALVE (WITH A "HARD" CHARGE) CAN RESULT
IN SEPARATOR FLOODING DUE TO INABILITY TO REMOVE CONDESATE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
LOSS OF INPUT POWER
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767792-2
C [ P ]
CAUSES: WIRE CHAFFING/SEVERS, CONTACT FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
5V POWER SUPPLY FAILS HIGH
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT, ELECTRONIC VOLTAGE CONTROL CIRCUIT FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REFERENCE VOLTAGE TO A/D CONVERTER RESULTS IN ANALOG-TO-
DIGITAL CONVERSION FUNCTION OF C&W SYSTEM. POSSIBLE FALSE
MESSAGES CAN RESULT. MISSION TERMINATION DUE TO LOSS OF C&W
FUNCTION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
5V REFERENCE SUPPLY FAILS LOW
HDW/FUNC
2/2
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV785970-5
CAUSES: OPEN OR SHORT CIRCUIT, ELECTRONIC VOLTAGE CONTROL
CIRCUIT FAILS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ANALOG-TO-DIGITAL CONVERSION FUNCTION FOR C&W PARAMETERS.
MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
EMU TIMELINE MEMORY FAILS
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS ON MEMORY, BUS FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
C&W TONE DISCRETE FAILS ON
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: SHORT CIRCUIT, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
C&W TONE GENERATED CONTINUOUSLY CAUSING CREW DISCOMFORT AND




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
C&W TONE DISCRETE FAILS OFF
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, THERMAL STRESS, BUFFER FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TONE CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON NOT BEING MADE AWARE OF A
PARTICULAR FAILURE (UPON ITS DETECTION BY THE C&W SYSTEM). IF A
SECOND FAILURE (I.E., A SUIT LEAK, HIGH C02, OR FAILED
SUBLIMATOR) SHOULD OCCUR IN CONCERT WITH TONE FAILURE, CREWPERSON
REACTION TIME COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED AND MAY RESULT IN
LOSS OF LIFE. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD OCCUR FOR THE FIRST
FAILURE IF DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
FAILURE OF PERMANENT MEMORY
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: INPUT/OUTPUT FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY OF CWS TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTIONS WITH INTEGRITY.




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS
CPU FAILURE





















I/O PORT FAILURE, GATE FAILURE, THERMAL STRESS, OPEN,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO PERFORM C&W PROCESSING AND CHECKS. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF CPU FAILURE INHIBITS TONE USAGE AND IS COMBINED
WITH A SECOND CRITICAL EMU FAILURE LOSS OF LIFE CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-If
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
ELECTRICAL SHORT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, WIRE CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ANY POWER SUPPLY OR MAJOR ELECTRONIC FUNCTION CAN SEVERLY
INHIBIT CWS OPERATION. MISSION TERMINATION. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
LOSS IF COMBINED WITH A SECOND "CRITICAL" EMU FAILURE DURING EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










PRIMARY REGULATOR (ITEM II3D)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV77873-12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BALANCE STEM MISALIGNED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN ACCEPTABLE PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO
IMPACT TO MISSION OR CREWMEMBER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










H20 REGULATOR (ITEM II3E)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV77873-12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BALANCE STEM MISALIGNED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN ACCEPTABLE PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO
IMPACT TO MISSION OR IMPACT CREWPERSON SAFETY.
REFERENCES:










SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
FILTER CLOGS AT DCM FILL OR END FITTING





















POSSIBLE INABILITY TO CHARGE THE PLSS WITH 02. MISSION




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










SHEAR PLATE ASSEMBLY (ITEM 115)
CONTAMINATION BREAKTHROUGH AT DCM END FITTING





















CONTAMINATON WOULD NORMALLY BE PICKED UP BY 02 MANIFOLD FILTERS;
HOWEVER, IF THESE FILTERS WERE ALSO FAILED CONTAMINATION CAN
RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE 113 REGULATOR AND REQUIRE SOP USAGE TO
RETURN TO VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










CO2 TRANSDUCER (ITEM 122)
SLOW RESPONSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767798-I
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MEMBRANE DOES NOT PASS SAMPLE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT RESULTS FROM THE SENSOR FAILURE; HOWEVER, IF
THE CCC ALSO FALIED, HIGH CO2 LEVEL CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS
THROUGH DISORIENTATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
CAUSES : MATERIAL DEFECT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FRACTURE OF FAN BLADE RESULTS IN LOSS OF VENT LOOP; IF SOP ALSO
FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST. ADDITIONALLY, SEINCE THE FAN
BLADES ARE METALLIC, A FAN BLADE STRIKING THE HOUSING CAN RESULT
IN AN OXYGEN FIRE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/8S E-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










PRIMARY H20 TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
LEVER LATCH ASSEMBLY FAILS - BATTERY
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, LATCH FRACTURE, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LATCH FEATURES TWO LOCKING MECHANISMS FOR THE BATTERY. THE
BATTERY ELECTRICAL CONNECTION AND THE TMG PROVIDE ADDITIONAL
RETENTION CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF ONE LOCK MECHANISM WILL HAVE NO
IMPACT, HOWEVER, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANT MECHANISMS AND THE
SOP CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










PRIMARY WATER TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
LEVER LATCH ASSEMBLY FAILS - CCC
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: SPRING FRACTURE, LATCH FRACTURE, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LATCH FEATURES TWO LOCKING MECHANISMS FOR THE CCC. THE CCC
CONNECTIONS AND THE TMG PROVIDE ADDITIONAL RETENTION CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF ONE LOCK MECHANISM WILL HAVE NO IMPACT,
HOWEVER, FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANT MECHANISMS FOR CCC RETENTION
CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS FROM DEPRESSURIZATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










PRIMARY WATER TANK ASSEMBLY (ITEM 131/162)
GAS LINES CLOG
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE KRYTOX OR BLADDERS MOVES AND BLOCKS LINES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BLADDER PRESSUREANT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
SUPPLY SUBLIMATOR PRESSURIZED FEEDWATER AND TO SUPPLY MAKEUP LCVG
H20/COOLING H20. THIS WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF COOLING FUNCTION
AND MISSION TERMINATION. IF SOP ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON CAN
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-21
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































LOSS OF SUBLIMATOR RESULTS IN LOSS OF PRIMARY TEMPERATURE CONTROL
TECHNIQUE. MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS; HOWEVER, IF COMBINED
WITH LOSS OF SOP COOLING, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










POSITIVE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (ITEM 146)
VALVE CHATTER
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV787036-3
CAUSES: SPRING UNSEAT/RESEAT FORCE HIGH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUIT PRESSURE WILL BE "JUMPY" DURING DEPRESS DUE TO VALVE CHATTER
BUT WILL NOT RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION OR CREWPERSON INJURY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










RESERVE WATER TANK (ITEM 148)
GAS LINES CLOG
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV769592-24
CAUSES: EXCESSIVE KRYTOX ON BLADDERS MOVES AND BLOCKS LINES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF BLADDER PRESSURANT WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
EMPLOY SUBLIMATOR AND TO SUPPLY MAKEUP H20 FOR LCVG AND COOLING
LOOPS. MISSION TERMINATION. IF SOP ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON CAN BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










PLSS/SOP TMG (ITEM 161)
LOOSE TMG PARTIALLY EXPOSES PLSS/SOP













PRE-EVA : 2/ 2
EVA : i/1
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV772168-15
CAUSES: SEAM SEPARATION, THREAD/CORD BREAKS, FASTENER OPENS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOT WILL RESULT. IF HEATING RESULTS ON PLSS 02
BOTTLES OR SOP 02 BOTTLES, GAS PRESSURE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY
INCREASE DUE TO NO PRESSURE RELIEF AT THE BOTTLES. POSSIBLE
RUPTURE/EXPLOSION OF OXYGEN TANK(S) CAN CAUSE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM (ITEM 174)
LOSS OF SIGNAL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV791230-2
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, POWER LOSS, COMPONENT/SENSOR FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EKG SIGNAL NOT REQUIRED FOR EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








REAL TIME DATA SYSTEM
ELECTRICAL SHORT













PRE-EVA : 2/ 2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA : 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV791230-2
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELECTRICAL SHORT CAN CAUSE PARTIAL TO TOTAL LOSS OF DC/DC
CONVERTER OR EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW. MISSION TERMINATION




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778475-13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BALANCE STEM AND SPRING NOT MATCHED UP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










SECOND STAGE REGULATOR (ITEM 213D)
OSCILLATING OUTPUT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV778475-13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISMATCHED PARTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OSCILLATING OUTPUT WITHIN PRESSURE LIMITS WILL HAVE NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EMU
MDAC ID: 731 FLIGHT: 2/2
ITEM: COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN - BATTERY RECHARGE SENSE LINE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTACT SEVERS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSE SIGNAL WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO RECHARGE
BATTERY. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










COMMON MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (ITEM 330)
ELECTRICAL SHORT - BATTERY RECHARGE SENSE LINE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778872-II
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, CHAFFING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORT WILL CAUSE BATTERY DISCHARGE AND WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATON AT PRE-EVA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




































IF BOTH COMMUNICATIONS SETS ARE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










COLUME CONTROL (ITEM 360)
SHAFT BREAKS
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767784-I
CAUSES: IMPACT, EXCESSIVE FORCE APPLIED TO SHAFT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CHANGE VOLUME. POSSIBLE LOSS OF ONE COMMUNICATIONS
SET. TERMINATE MISSION IF BOTH SETS ARE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION




















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION ON CONTACTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-34
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










DISPLAY INTENSITY CONTROL (ITEM 361)
BROKEN SHAFT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767785-I
CAUSES: IMPACT, EXCESSIVE FORCE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO VERY DISPLAY INTENSITY.
DISPLAY MAY REQUIRE SHADING.
IF ENVIRONMENT IS BRIGHT,
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








CAUTION AND WARNING SWITCH (ITEM 368)
SWITCH FAILS IN CENTER (OFF) POSITION






















CAUSES: BEARING BINDS, CAM BINDS, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










SUIT PRESSURE GAGE (ITEM 311)
LIGHT FAILS OFF















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767706-3




CREWPERSON CAN EMPLOY AVAILABLE LIGHTING OR
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM TMG (ITEM 384)
PARTIALLY EXPOSES DCM
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771987-II
CAUSES: SEAM SEPARATION, THREAD/CORD SEVERS OR COMES UNDONE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "COLD/HOT" SPOTS ON DCM ARE REMOTE FROM CREWPERSON AND HIGH
PRESSURE OXYGEN. ELECTRONICS SHOULD NOT BE AFFECTED DUE TO HEAT
DISTRIBUTION. NO IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










SHEATH ASSEMBLY (ITEM 428)
CLOTH TORN
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771749-3
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, ABRASION, SEAM SEPARATES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACTS SINCE SCU IS NOT IN A SEVERE THERMAL ENVIRONMENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
ADAPTER DETACHES FROM WALL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767680-03
CAUSES: MOUNTING BRACKET FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ANY ONE BRACKET WOULD RESULT IN AAP DETACHING. MISSION
TERMINATION. FAILURE MODE WILL MOST LIKELY OCCUR DURING ASCENT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










AIRLOCK ADAPTER PLATE (ITEM 470)
EMU DETACHES FROM AAP
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767680-03
CAUSES: LATCH MECHANISM FAILS OPEN/FRACTURES, PIN FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO PIN-LATCH MECHANISMS OR ONE OF TWO PIN INSERT
MECHANISMS CAN RESULT IN DETACHMENT DURING ASCENT LOADS. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767680-03
CAUSES: SCU LATCH FAILS OPEN/FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SCU DETACHMENT CAN RESULT IN DAMAGE TO SCU, AIRLOCK, AND EMU
DURING ASCENT. MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








CONTAMINATE CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
FAILS TO REMOVE C02
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: CHANNELING, EARLY LIFE LIMIT REACHED, MOISTURE
PENETRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CO2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF CONCURRENT C02 SENSOR FAILURE ALSO OCCURS,




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










CONTAMINANT CONTROL CARTRIDGE (ITEM 480)
OVERHEATING/HYROGEN GENERATION
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792600-00
CAUSES: WATER IN LiOH
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADED CO2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY WILL RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF COUPLED WITH A CO2 SENSOR FAILURE CREWPERSON CAN
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









OPEN IN BATT SENSE LINE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV771763-3
CAUSES: VIBRATION, WIRE SEVERS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SENSE SIGNAL WILL RESULT IN INABILITY TO RECHARGE




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









SHORT IN BATT SENSE LINE



























REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











02 LEAKAGE TO ELECTRONICS/ROTOR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: SV787994-8
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE-GALLED, AGE, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
02 LEAKAGE INTO ELECTRONICS CAN RESULT IN AN OXYGEN FIRE AND
CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILS STUCK AT NOMINAL PRESSURE VALUE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV767788-2
CAUSES: INTERNAL LINKAGE FAILURE, WIPER STICKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF ONLY ONE FAILURE, NO IMPACTS WOULD RESULT. HOWEVER, IF
COMBINED WITH A PLSS REGULATOR FAILURE OR A LEAK THE SOP WOULD
NECESSARILY BE USED AND MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV778540-26
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, JOINT FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FREE MOVEMENT OF THE REGULATOR ASSEMBLY ACTUATION MECHANISM CAN
RESULT IN MOVEMENT OUT OF THE EVA POSITION. WERE THIS TO OCCUR
WITH FAILURES OF REDUNDANT PRESSURE MAINTENENACE FUNCTIONS (E.G.,
A LEAK) THE PLSS AND SOP MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE AND CREWPERSON
COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV778540-26
B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE IOA RECOGNIZES THAT I0 MOUNTING SCREWS EXIST AND SEVEN ARE
REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN INTEGRITY. THEREFORE 3 SCREW MUST BE LOST
BEFORE THE SYSTEM AND CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











REDUCED AIR STREAM HEAT REMOVAL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: CONTAMINANT DEPOSITION ON HEAT EXCHANGER WALLS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF HEAT EXCHANGER EFFICIENCY CAN RESULT IN WARMER VENT FLOW
THAN DESIRED. THIS IN TURN DEGRADES THE HUMIDITY CONTROL
FUNCTION AND CAN LEAD TO FOGGING OF THE HELMET AREA AND SOP
OPERATION. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT. IF THE SOP WERE ALSO
FAILED, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST FROM DISORIENTATION DUE TO HELMET
FOGGING.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












POROUS PLATE SPATIAL RELATION TO SUBLIMATOR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV783850-14
CAUSES: IMPACT ON POROUS PLATE MOUNTING EDGE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DECREASED EFFICIENCY CAN LEAD TO LOSS/DEGRADATION OF HUMIDITY
CONTROL AND COOLING FUNCTIONS. MISSION TERMINATION WILL RESULT
AS WILL SOP OPERATIONS. WERE THE SOP ALSO FAILED, THE CREWPERSON
WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
5.6V POWER SUPPLY FAILS OFF
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV785970-5
CAUSES: OPEN AT 5.6V INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 5V NON-VOLATILE RAM POWER AND 5V DIGITAL POWER SUED BY
NUMEROUS C&W COMPONENTS THEREBY CAUSING OVERALL C&W LOSS.
MISSION TERMINATION SHOULD RESULT. ADDITIONALLY, WERE A
SIMULTANEOUS CCC FAILURE TO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








CAUTION AND WARNING ELECTRONICS (ITEM 150)
TIMELINE MEMORY FAILS AT X=I
HDW/FUNC
2/1R




















CAUSES: INTERNAL MEMORY ADDRESS LATCH FAILS CLOSED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF NUMEROUS EVA CAUTION AND WARNING MONITORING FUNCTIONS
(INCLUDING CO2 LEVELS). MISSION TERMINATION. WERE THE CCC TO
ALSO FAIL, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: IMPACT, STRIPPED SCREW, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT FOR FAILURE OF SINGLE SCREW/BRACKET; HOWEVER, IF ALL
WERE TO FAIL THE DCM COULD DETACH FROM THE HUT AND CAUSE LOSS OF
CREWPERSON DUE TO GROSS EXTERNAL OXYGEN LEAKAGE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT IN PRIMARY EVC CURRENT





















LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION. NO INPACT UNLESS SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN DOWNSTREAM ELECTRONICS (I.E., A SHORT) RESULTS IN
EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW UPON THE BATTERY. THIS CAN RESULT IN A
SHORTENED MISSION OR LOSS OF BATTERY POWER. IF BATTERY POWER IS
LOST THE SOP WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO RETURN TO VEHICLE. THEREFORE,
LOSS OF LIFE CAN RESULT IF THE SOP WERE ALSO FAILED.
REFERENCES:













DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
INPUT TO OUTPUT SHORT IN FEEDWATER VALVE CURRENT





















LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION. NO IMPACT UNLESS SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE IN DOWNSTREAM ELECTRONICS (I.E., A SHORT) CAUSES
EXCESSIVE CURRENT DRAW UPON THE BATTERY. THIS CAN RESULT IN A
SHORTENED MISSION OR LOSS OF BATTERY POWER. IF BATTERY POWER IS
LOST,
THE SOP IS REQUIRED FOR RETURN TO VEHICLE; HOWEVER, IF THE SOP
WERE ALSO FAILED, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
BATTERY POWER "ON" DISCRETE FAILS OFF
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF CONSUMMABLES MANAGEMENT AND MONITORING FUNCTION BY CWS.
WERE A SECOND FAILURE TO RESULT (I.E., AN OXYGEN LEAK), THE
CREWPERSON MAY BE REQUIRED TO EMPLOY THE SOP TO RETURN TO
VEHICLE. IF THE SOP WERE ALSO FAILED THE CREWPERSON COULD BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
BATTERY POWER "ON" DISCRETE FAILS ON
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: LIMITED SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE DURING IV OPERATIONS; OTHERWISE, NO IVA OR EVA
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWITCH DISCRETE FAILS OFF
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE DISPLAYED AND LOSS OF CWS SUBLIMATOR PRESSURE
MONITORING FOR LIMIT VIOLATIONS. SUBLIMATOR PRESSURE READOUT
REMAINS AVAILABLE. NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FEEDWATER VALVE SWTICH DISCRETE FAILS ON
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: LIMITED SHORT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE DURING IVA OPERATONS; OTHERWISE, NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAN/PUMP SWITCH DISCRETE FAILS OFF
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF THIS DISCRETE CAUSES ERRONEOUS FAN STATUS MESSAGE AND
LOSS OF CWS VENT FLOW MONITORING. WERE VENT FLOW ALSO FAILED
SUCH THAT AN INEFFICIENT ORAL/NASAL FLUSH TO OCCUR, THE
CREWPERSON COULD BE SUBJECTED TO HIGH CO2 LEVELS THAT CAN RESULT
IN
DISORIENTATION AND LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-62
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
FAN/PUMP SWITCH DISCRETE FAILS ON





















ERRONEOUS MESSAGE GENERATION WHEN FAN IS ACTUALLY OFF.





REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-63
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
VEHICLE VOLTAGE DISCRETE FAILS OFF
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ERRONEOUS MESSAGE GENERATION DURING IVA; OTHERWISE, NO OTHER
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
VEHICLE VOLTAGE DISCRETE FAILS ON





















LOSS OF CWS MONITORING FOR HIGH AXYGEN USE RATE AND H20 OFF
STATUS DURING EVA. SHOULD AN OXYGEN ALSO OCCUR DURING EVA THE
CREWPERSON WOULD NOT BE ALERTED (EXCEPT BY THE CONSUMMABLES
MANAGEMENT FUNCTION WHICH WOULD INDICATE ONLY 30 MINUTES OXYGEN
LEFT;
HOWEVER, THIS TIME COULD BE ERRONEOUS DUE TO THE MANNER OF THE
CWS CALCULATION). THIS CAN RESULT IN SOP USAGE WHICH IF ALSO
FAILED CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT IN CLIV CURRENT LIMITER





















LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF ALL
POWER SHOULD A SUBSEQUENTDOWNSTREAM SHORT OCCUR. IF THE SOP IS
ALSO FAILED WITH LOSS OF POWER, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
DC/DC CURRENT LIMITER FAILS OPEN
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL CYCLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF DC/DC CONVERTER SUPPORTED ELECTRONICS - CWS, SENSORS, AND
RTDS. MISSION TERMINATION. WERE A CO2 CONTROL FUNCTION FAILURE
TO ALSO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON COULD BECOME DISORIENTED AND UNABLE
TO REACT PROPERLY, THEREBY CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT FOR DC/DC CONVERTER CURRENT





















LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION. IF ACCOMPANIED BY A DOWNSTREAM
SHORT THE BATTERY COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY DRAWN DOWN SUCH THAT
PLSS FUNCTIONS COULD NOT BE SATISFIED AND THE SOP REQUIRED. AN
ADDITIONAL SOP FAILURE COULD THEN RESULT IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-68
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
NEGATIVE CURRENT RETURN LINE FAILS OPEN





















LOSS OF CIRCUIT AND, THEREFORE, ALL EMU POWER. MISSION
TERMINATION. IF THE SOP WERE ALSO FAILED, THE CREWPERSON WOULD
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
MOTOR TACH SIGNAL OPEN/SHORT





















LOSS OF MOTOR TACHAMETER SENSING.
CREWPERSON.




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-70
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
TEMPORARY DROP IN DC/DC CONVERTER VOLTAGES

























REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
RADIATED EMISSIONS HIGH


























REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-72
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
SHORT INPUT TO OUTPUT OF SECONDARY EVC CURRENT





















LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITER FUNCTION CAN RESULT IN COMPLETE EMU POWER
LOSS IF ACCOMPANIED BY DOWNSTREAM SHORT. POSSIBLE CREWPERSON
LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS IN THIS SCENARIO.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT








DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
ALL SECONDARY VOLTAGES DRIFT HIGH
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRONIC FAILURE IN FEEDBACK GENERATOR OR MODULATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH VOLTAGE SUPPLIED TO "LOW VOLTAGE" ELECTRONICS CAN RESULT IN
FAILURE OF THESE ITEMS. IF A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF CO2 CONTROL
FUNCTION OCCURS, THE CREWPERSON COULD BECOME DISORIENTED AND
POSSIBLY LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-74
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DCM ELECTRONICS (ITEM 350)
LCD MICROPROCESSOR FAILURE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV792291
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LCD DISPLAY WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION. THIS
WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE TONES AND ACTUAL MONITORING OF VALUES
BY THE CWS; HOWEVER, IF A CONCURRENT CO2 CONTROL FAILURE OR LOW
VENT FLOW FAILURE WERE TO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON WOULD BE
ALERTED BUT NOT INFORMED OF THE PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTION.
THEREFORE, THE CREWMEMBER CAN BE SUBJECTED TO HIGH CO2 AND
DISORIENTATION PRIOR TO RETURN TO VEHICLE. DISORIENTATION CAN
RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART }Fu'MBER: SV 792526-1
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, CLOCK FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAY OUTPUT WILL NOT CHANGE OR BLANK. THIS IS THE SAME
"EFFECT" AS LOSS OF DISPLAY. IF A CONCURRENT CO2 CONTROL FAILURE
WERE TO ALSO OCCUR, THE CREWPERSON WOULD NOT BE ALERTED TO THE
PROPER CORRECTIVE ACTION ALTHOUGH THE TONE WILL OCCUR. THIS CAN
RESULT IN CREWPERSON DISORIENTATION AND LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-76
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 792526-1
CAUSES: SHORT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 792526-1
CAUSES: ELECTRICAL OPEN, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WILL NOT INHIBIT USE OF THE DISPLAY; THEREFORE, NO IMPACT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-78
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAKAGE AT HUT FEEDTHROUGH





















LOSS OF OXYGEN SUPPLY REQUIRES SOP USAGE TO RETURN TO VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE CREWPERSON LOSS IF SOP ALSO FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL FATIGUE/DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LOWER BRACKET (ONE OF TWO) CAN RESULT IN SEPARATION OF
HUT AND PLSS IF SECOND BRACKET ALSO LOST. IF SECOND BRACKET IS
ALSO LOST AND SEPARATION WERE TO OCCUR EVA, CREWPERSON WOULD BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-80
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











H20 MAKEUP TUBE-EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FEEDWATER SUPPLY CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF HUMIDITY CONTROL.
IF SOP ALSO LOST, CREWPERSON WILL BE LOST DUE TO NO DEFOG
CAPABILITY FOR HELMET.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE o2/2s/88 E-81
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









02 PRESSURE RELIEF TUBE - EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV 789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, SEAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY OXYGEN SUPPLY RESULTS IN SOP USAGE.





REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-82
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV789200
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, SCREW(S) SHEAR,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE LATCH OF SECURE THE EMU TO THE MMU WILL RESULT IN
DEPENDENCY UPON THE RETENTION BELT (OTHER LATCH ALONE IS
INSUFFICIENT). IF THE RETENTION BELT WERE TO FAIL DURING EMU-MMU
OPERATIONS, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST DUE TO SEPARATION FROM
THE MMU.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL LEAKAGE OF HELMET INLET DUCT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: SEAL WEAR OR DETERIORATION, CONTAMINATION ON SEAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MINIMAL LOSS OF VENT FLOW TO HELMET SHOULD NOT HAVE MISSION OR
CREW IMPACT. CAN RESULT IN MINOR LOSS OF SOP OXYGEN DURING SOP
CHECK BUT SHOULD ALSO NOT BE A SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY TO HAVE
NEGATIVE IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-84
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
INTERNAL LOOP TAPE CLIP ATTACHMENT SCREW LOOSE OR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: SCREW DEFECTIVE, INEFFECTIVE THREADLOCK, CORROSION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON THE BRACKET; HOWEVER, A LOOSE SCREW WITH THE SSA
(DURING AN EVA) CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT, ABRATION OF
WATER LINES ON THE LCVG (SUCH THAT A LEAK CAN OCCUR), OR SUIT
BLADDER ABRASION. SUCH AN EFFECT CAN RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. ALSO IF ALL THE SCREWS FAILED, BRACKET LOSS OF
FUNCTION SHOULD HAVE NO MORE SEVERE AN EFFECT THAN THE LOOSE
SCREW.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











NECK RING AND VENT SEAL ASSEMBLY
EXTERNAL LOOP TAPE BRACKET ATTACHING SCREW LOOSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9357-10/9713-03
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE SCREW, INEFFECTIVE THREADLOCK, CORROSION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SCREW SHOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON BRACKET; HOWEVER, LOSS
OF ALL SCREWS AND THEREFORE BRACKET FUNCTION CAN RESULT IN
UNRESTRAINED TMG GARMENT WHICH IN TURN CAN CAUSE POSSIBLE "HOT"
OR "COLD" SPOTS. MISSION TERMINATION WOULD THEN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-86
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










WATER LINE AND VENT TUBE ASSEMBLY
REDUCED VENT FLOW





















PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF VENT TUBE REDUCES FLOW. MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS. IF SIGNIFICANT FLOW REDUCTION OCCURS AND THE SOP IS
ALSO FAILED, CREWMEMBER LOSS CAN ALSO OCCUR.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








BODY SEAL CLOSURE (HUT HALF)
TMG LOOP TAPE LOOSE OR BROKEN
HDW/FUNC
2/2
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MATERIALS DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL HOT OR COLD SOPTS CAN RESULT. DEPENDENT UPON THE
ENVIRONMENT, THIS CAN PRESENT THE CREWPERSON WITH SIGNIFICANT
DISCOMFORT OVER TIME; THEREFORE, MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-88
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









MINI WORK STATION WILL NOT ENGAGE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9786-05
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION IN MORENTS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE ADHESIVE, IMPACT BY CREWPERSON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-90
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











HELMET FOGGING (NOT DUE TO SYSTEM FAILURE)
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
CAUSES: IMPROPER APPLICATION OF ANTI FOG FILM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOGGING CAN IMPAIR VISION AND PERFORMANCE OF EVA TASKS. TERMINATE
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









VENT PAD DE-BONDS FROM HELMET
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
CAUSES: OLD OR DEFECTIVE BONDING AGENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DEGRADATION OF ORAL-NASAL FLUSH CAN RESULT IN HELMET FOGGING AND
CO2 BUILDUP. USE OF HELMET CPV AND/OR DCM PURGE VALVE AND SOP
MAY BE REQUIRED, BUT IF THESE TOO ARE FAILED, CREWPERSON CAN BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-92
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EVVA VISOR MOVEMENT CAN BE IMPAIRED AS COULD THE CAPABILITY TO
MOUNT THE LIGHTS. THIS CAN RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-93
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-94
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











BRACKET LOOSE FOR LIGHTS OR BATTERY
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK, SCREW FRACTURES, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF THREE BRACKETS SHOULD NOT RESULT IN IMPACT;
HOWEVER, LOSS OF ONE MORE CAN RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-95
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










UPPER/LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
TMG LOOSE





















LOOP TAPE DEFECTIVE/TORN, VELCRO DEFECTIVE, THREAD/CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOCALIZED HOT OR COLD SPOTS CAN RESULT ARM ASSEMBLY. IF
ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE, THESE SPOTS CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT SUFFICIENT ENOUGH FOR MISSION IMPACT OR TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-96
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











UPPER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
AXIAL RESTRAINT SEAM SEPARATION OR SIZING INSERT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82318-22
CAUSES: FABRIC DEFECT, DEFECTIVE THREAD OR CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER IS STILL UNDER TMG AND CAN ACCEPT OPERATING SUIT
PRESSURES BUT IS SUBJECT TO ABRASION AND WEAR. IF BLADDER WERE
TO ALSO FAIL, CREWPERSON LOSS CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RESTRAINT BRACKET SCREW LOOSE
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9782-04
CAUSES: IMPACT, VIBRATION, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK OR SCREW
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACT FOR LOSS OF 1 OF 4 SCREWS. BUT IF ONE MORE IS LOST
ASSEMBLY COULD SEPARATE AND CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-98
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOWER PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN/FAILED
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9657-06
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPACT, KEEPER SCREW BACKED OUT,
DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL LOAD RESTRAINT INTEGRITY. IF COMBINED WITH
LOSS OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT OR COMPLETE LOSS OF ATTACHMENT
SCREWS, CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-02, A/L 9814-02
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE IMPACT DUE TO BLADDER FABRIC BEING SECONDARY
RESTRAINT; HOWEVER, FAILURE OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT CAN RESULT IN
GROSS OXYGEN LOSS AND LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET LOOSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-02, A/L 9814-02
CAUSES: SCREW FRACTURES OR BACKS OUT, VIBRATION, DEFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOOSE BRACKET HAS NO IMPACT UNLESS REMAINING SCREWS AND SECONDARY
RESTRAINT ALSO LOST THEREBY CAUSING GROSS LOSS OF PRESSURE AND
CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-101
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































CREW DISCOMFORT CAN RESULT BUT THIS FAILURE CAN ONLY RESULT FROM
PROCEDURAL OR GROUND OPERATION/PROCESSING ERRORS. THEREFORE,
THIS IS MORE SUITED TO A HAZARD ANALYSIS OR AN ANALYSIS OF GSE
OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-102
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































DEFECTIVE LOOP TAPE, DEFECTIVE CORD, WEAR ON LOOP TAPE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOCALIZED HOT/COLD SPOTS WHICH, DEPENDENT UPON THE
ENVIRONMENT, CAN RESULT IN VARYING LEVELS OF CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. IF ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE AND CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT
SIGNIFICANT, MISSION CAN BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-103
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









FLOCK DELAMINATES FROM BLADDER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-87543-01/02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE ADHESIVE, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FLOCK CAN ENTER THE VENT SYSTEM. IF SIGNIFICANT FLOCK AMOUNT
CAN TRANSLATE TO AND CONSTRICT FLOW TO THE CCC, THE CREWPERSON
WOULD HAVE TO EMPLOY THE SOP AND TERMINATE THE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-104
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN OR LOOSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9924-01
CAUSES: IMPACT, VIBRATION, SCREW FRACTURE, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE FOR FIRST FAILURE; HOWEVER, IF REMAINING BRACKET SCREWS FAIL
OR LOSS OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT ALSO OCCURS CREWPERSON CAN BE
LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-105
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








WRIST DISCONNECT (GLOVE SIDE)
TETHER SEVERS OR DISATTACHES
HDW/FUNC
2/2
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9924-01
S [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, ABRASION, BRACKET FRACTURES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TETHER FALURE HAS NO CREWPERSON IMPACT BUT CAN RESULT IN
MISSION TERMINATION IF ITEM(S) TETHERED ARE ESSENTIAL TO THE
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-106
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
HOLE OR SEPARATION IN RESTRAINT FABRIC
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-I07/0104-84811-05
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL OR THREAD, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER FABRIC ASSUMES LOAD; HOWEVER, IF BLADDER FAILS CREWPERSON
CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-107
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
AXIAL RESTRAINT DISATTACHES FROM CLOTH
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-i07/0104-84811-05
CAUSES: THREAD BREAKS OR DEFECTIVE, FABRIC DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT CAUSES THE WAIST SECTION TO DISFORM AND
RESULTS IN THE CREWPERSON HAVING TO PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT EXERTION
TO OVERCOME THE DISFORMATION OF THE WAIST AREA. MISSION IMPACT
AND TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-108
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










WAIST RESTRAINT AND BLADDER
TMG LOOSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82347-107/0104-84811-05
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE/WORN THREAD, DEFECTIVE FABRIC
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS WHICH CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. IF ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE AND CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT
SIGNIFICANT, MISSION WOULD BE TERMINATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-109
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATI ON:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: FRACTURED OR LOOSE SCREW, DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 1 OF 4 SCREWS RESULTS IN LOOSE TETHER BRACKET WITH NO
IMMEDIATE IMPACT. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ONE MORE SCREW CAN RESULT IN
LOSS OF BRACKET AND CREWPERSON BEING UNRESTRAINED TO ORBITER.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II0
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
HOLE OR SEPARATION IN RESTRAINT















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: FABRIC/THREAD DEFECTIVE, WEAR OR TEAR, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER UNPROTECTED BY RESTRAINT MATERIAL WILL ASSUME SUIT LOADS;
HOWEVER, IF BLADDER ALSO FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-Ill
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT/BLADDER ASSEMBLY
TMG SEPARATION FROM ASSEMBLY
HDW/FUNC
2/2
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE/TORN LOOP TAPE, MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT. IF THE
ENVIRONMENT IS SEVERE ENOUGH, CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT CAN BE
SIGNIFICANT AND RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT (PRIMARY OR SECONDARY)
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9752-01
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, SCREW BACKS OUT, INEFFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUIT LOADS WILL BE ASSUMED BY REMAINING RESTRAINT WHICH, IF ALSO
FAILED, CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS DUE TO INABILITY OF SUIT TO
WITHSTAND LOADS AT BOOT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-f13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HEEL-TOP RETAINING SCREW LOOSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK, VIBRATION, SCREW
FRACTURED/STRIPPED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAY CAUSE DIFFICULTY IN USING FOOT RESTRAINT NECESSARY FOR




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II4
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: WEAR, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS ON SOLE OF BOOT ASSEMBLY. MAY
ALSO CREATE DIFFICULTY IN USING FOOT RESTRAINT(S). IF CREW
DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT OR UNABLE TO EMPLOY FOOT RESTRAINT,
TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-If5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HOLE OR TEAR IN RESTRAINT FABRIC
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, DEFECTIVE/TORN THREAD/CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER WOULD BE SUBJECTED TO LOADS AND WEAR DUE TO LOSS OF
COVERING RESTRAINT FABRIC. IF BLADDER ALSO FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN
BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82403-29/30
CAUSES: LOOP TAPE DEFECTIVE/TORN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT.
ALSO, LOOSE TMG CAN CAUSE DIFFICULTY IN USING FOOT RESTRAINTS.
IF DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT OR FOOT RESTRAINTS CANNOT BE USED,
TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









FOAM SEPARATES FROM INSERT





















NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
DIFFICULT.




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-II8
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: THREAD TEARS OR DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CAN PROVIDE MINIMAL CREW DISCOMFORT BUT WHEN CONNECTED AND SUIT
IS DONNED NO IMPACTS ARE ENVISIONED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-If9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
THRUMB LOOP BROKEN
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-811060-08/82568-09/81057-19/20
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT OR TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-120
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








VENT MANIFOLD AND DUCTS
BOOT ATTACHMENT LOOSE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-811060-08/82568-09/81057-19/20
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT OR TORN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-121
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










MULTIPLE CONNECTOR (LCVG HALF)
OXYGEN LEAKAGE IN VENT LOOP
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9693-03/9697-04
CAUSES: SEAL CUT OR DEFECTIVE, LOOSE HOSE CLAMP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF SUIT ATMOSPHERE INTO VENT LOOP AT CONNECTOR MAY RESULT
IN MINIMAL DEGRADATION OF VENT LOOP FLOW THROUGHOUT THE LCVG BUT
WITHOUT A SIGNIFICANT FAILURE (I.E., DISCONNECTION) THE LEAK
SHOULD NOT RESULT IN A MISSION OR CREWMEMBER IMPACT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-122
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0101-80001-02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE/BROKEN THREAD, FASTENER FAILS OPEN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONE LOOSE EARPHONE WILL NOT RESULT IN AN IMPACT; HOWEVER, IF BOTH
ARE LOOSE, MISSION TERMINATION RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-123
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0101-80001-02
CAUSES: SNAP WORN OR BENT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIFFICULTY IN DOFFING CAN RESULT BUT, OTHERWISE, NO IMPACTS TO
MISSION OR CREWPERSON SAFETY.
REFERENCES:













MICROPHONEBOOMSHIFTS OUT OF RANGE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0101-80001-02
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE OR WORN FASTENER, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MICROPHONE PRESENTS NO IMPACTS DUE TO AVAILABILITY OF
SECOND MICROPHONE. IF BOTH ARE LOST, TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











02 LINE LEAKAGE TO SSA





















02 LEAKAGE TO SSA WILL NOT SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCE FLOW TO HELMET;
THEREFORE, NO MISSION OR CREWPERSON IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











H20 LEAKAGE INTO SSA
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES: SEAL FAILURE, TUBE PUNCTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GRADUAL LOSS OF H20 SUPPLY AND THEREFORE COOLING CAPABILITY.
FREE WATER IN SUIT CAN GET INTO VENT LOOP AND CAUSE FAILURE OF
CCC. MISSION TERMINATION. IF SOP ALSO LOST OR PURGE VALVES
BLOCKED BY ICE, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











VENT RETURN FLOW PARTIALLY OR TOTALLY BLOCKED
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER : SV772375-21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, HAIR, FLOCK, LINT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOW VENT FLOW WILL REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION AND POSSIBLE SOP
USAGE. IF SOP ALSO FAILS, CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-128
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











GIMBAL PIVOT SOCKET FAILURE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, DEFECTIVE BOND, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BELLOWS CAN SEPARATE FROM HUT WITH GIMBAL PIVOT SOCKET FAILURE
AND CAUSE UNCONTROLLABLE DEPRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

























POST-EVA : 3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: SV772375-21
CAUSES : DEFECTIVE BOND, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-130
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











IDB DETACHES OR FOOD BAR DETACHES















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-80002-105
CAUSES: VELCRO ADHESIVE DEFECTIVE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DISLODGED IDB OR FOOD BAR CAN POSITION ITSELF IN MANNER WHICH
CAUSES THE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT OR WHICH INHIBITS OPTIMUM
CREWPERSON PERFORMANCE. MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-131
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











BROKEN GIMBAL TRAVEL STOP STRAP
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-80002-105
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, ABRASION, CLAMP SCREWS MISSING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STRAP FALURE WILL CAUSE UNNECESSARY LOADING OF BELLOWS AT TRAVEL
EXTREMES. AXIAL PEELING OF BELLOWS CAN RESULT IN GROSS
DEPRESSURZATION. CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-132
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOOSE OR HAS HOLE
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0102-82782-32
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL OR LOOP TAPE, SEAM SEPARATION, TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN POSSIBLY CAUSE SIGNIFICANT CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT. POSSIBLE MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOOSE OR HAS HOLE IN IT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82405-10/0103-82406-07
CAUSES: MATERIAL/LOOP TAPE DEFECT, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT. IF
SIGNIFICANT DISCOMFORT RESULTS, CREWPERSON MAY TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 23869
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, CORROSION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF LEVERAGE IN UNLATCHING BODY SEAL CLOSURE. THIS IS AN
OPTIONAL ITEM AND ITS FAILURE WOULD BE AN IMPACT ONLY IF THE BODY
SEAL CLOSURE WERE DIFFICULT IN OPERATION. IF BOTH WERE FAILED
MISSION TERMINATION WOULD RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION:




INADVERTENT RELEASE OF HANDLES FROM BRACKET INCREASES DONNING
DIFFICULTY ONLY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-136
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HANDLES WILL NOT INSTALL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9857/9858
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFORMATION, IMPACT, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LOOSE OR HAS HOLE



















A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL/THREAD, SEAM SEPARATION, TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT.





REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-84906-03/04
CAUSES: TEAR, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS IS A CREW OPTION ITEM AND ITS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HOLE OR SEPARATION IN TMG
HDW/FUNC
2/2
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-88074-01/02
CAUSES: WEAR, MATERIAL/THREAD DEFECT, TEAR, DEFECTIVE VELCRO
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS WHICH CAN CAUSE CREWPERSON DISCOMFORT.
DISCOMFORT IS SIGNIFICANT, MISSION TERMINATION CAN RESULT.
IF
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-140
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











TMG DETACHES FROM RESTRAINT





















THIS WILL ONLY RESULT IN SOME EXCESS TMG MOVEMENT WHICH SHOULD
NOT REDUCE GLOVE FUNCTION OR IMPACT SAFETY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









FINGER TIPS LOOSE OR ABRADED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-88074-01/02
CAUSES: CONTACT WITH SHARP OBJECT, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL/BOND
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FALURE MAY SLIGHTLY INCREASE DIFFICULTY OF EVA ACTIVITIES
WHICH EMPLOY "FINGER-TIP" ACTIVITIES (I.E., SWITCH MOVEMENTS) BUT
SHOULD NOT IMPACT MISSION OR SAFETY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-142
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

































THE LOCATION OF THESE ITEMS SHOULD INHIBIT THEIR TRANSLATION TO
OTHER AREAS IN SSA. NO IMPACT IS DETECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968
CAUSES: IMPACT CAUSES KINK IN LINE; MATERIAL DEFECT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBABLE DEGRADATION IN COOLING CAPABILITY. TERMINATE MISSION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-144
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HOLE OR SEPARATION IN MATERIAL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0108-84032-01
CAUSES: MATERIAL/THREAD DEFECT, SEAM SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOCAL "HOT/COLD" SPOTS SHOULD NOT CAUSE SIGNIFICANT CREW




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











INSULATION TORN OR SEPARATED





















LOCAL HOT SPOT CAN CAUSE DISCOMFORT. ASSUMING REQUIRED FOR
MISSION SUCCESS IF UNABLE TO EMPLOY MISSION, MISSION TERMINATION
RESULTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-146
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOWER PRIMARY RESTRAINT BRACKET BROKEN/FAILED
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9657-06
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, IMPACT, KEEPER SCREW BACKED OUT,
DEFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL LOAD RESTRAINT INTEGRITY. IF COMBINED WITH
LOSS OF SECONDARY RESTRAINT OR COMPLETE LOSS OF ATTACHMENT
SCREWS, CREWMEMBER COULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-147
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOWER ARM RESTRAINT AND BLADDER ASSEMBLY
AXIAL RESTRAINT SEAM SEPARATION OR SIZING INSERT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0103-82351-16
CAUSES: FABRIC DEFECT, DEFECTIVE THREAD OR CORD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLADDER IS STILL UNDER TMG AND CAN ACCEPT OPERATING SUIT
PRESSURES BUT IS SUBJECT TO ABRASION AND WEAR. IF BLADDER WERE
TO ALSO FAIL, CREWPERSON LOSS CAN RESULT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF AXIAL RESTRAINT (PRIMARY OR SECONDARY)













PRE- EVA: 2/ 2
EVA: 2/IR
POST-EVA: 2/2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9752-01
CAUSES: DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, SCREW BACKS OUT, INEFFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SUIT LOADS WILL BE ASSUMED BY REMAINING RESTRAINT WHICH, IF ALSO
FAILED, CAN RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS DUE TO INABILITY TO SUIT TO
WITHSTAND LOADS AT BOOT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LOSS OF ATTACHMENT EAR SEAL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CREWPERSON DOES NOT LOSE EAR COMMUNICATIONS BUT DOES GET




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-150
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF ABSORPTION ATTACHMENT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT, WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMPACTS TO COMMUNICATION CAPABILITY, MISSION OR CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









CHIN STRAP FAILS OPEN



















A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/WEAR, MECHANICAL FAILURE OF SNAP
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS CAN RESULT IN THE ENTIRE CCA SHIFTING SUCH THAT




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-152
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











SEPARATION OF BEARING RACES
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9782-04
CAUSES: MATERIAL FATIGUE, IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEPARATION OF ARM FROM SSA CAN RESULT WITH UNCONTROLLABLE EMU
DEPRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-153
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET SWIVEL
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER :
CAUSES : MATERIAL FATIGUE/WEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRIMARY LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WOULD BE LOST. MISSION
TERMINATION RESULTS. IF SECONDARY FUNCTION ALSO LOST, ARM
SEPARATION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-154
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










BODY SEAL CLOSURE (LTA SIDE)
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]° C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9787-05
CAUSES: LOOSE OR MISSING SCREWS, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY RESTRAINT LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WILL RESULT IN
MISSION TERMINATION. IF THE REDUNDANT RESTRAINT ALSO FAILS, THE
CREWPERSON WILL BE LOST.
REFERENCES:













UPPER PRIMARY EXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET FAILS
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: LOOSE OR MISSING SCREWS, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE,
IMPACT, INEFFECTIVE THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY SHOULD RESULT IN MISSION
TERMINATION. IF SECONDARY RESTRAINT ALSO FAILS, GROSS LOSS OF
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WILL RESULT IN CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-156
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF BALL BEARING RETAINER SCREW
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: STRIPPED/FRACTURED SCREW, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SCREW WILL NOT IMPACT CREWPERSON BUT LOSS OF SECOND
SCREW CAN RESULT IN LOSS OF BALL BEARING RETAINER AND THE SSA
PERSSURE INTEGRITY, THEREBY CAUSING LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF LOWER PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WILL CAUSE SECONDARY
RESTRAINT TO SUSTAIN LOADS; HOWEVER, IF THE SECONDARY WERE ALSO
LOST, THE CREWPERSON COULD BE LOST WHEN SSA PRESSURE INTEGRITY
FAILS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-158
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET, FRONT
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, SCRE FRACTURE, DEFECTIVE
THREADLOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY WILL CAUSE
SECONDARY RESTRAINT TO SUSTAIN LOADS. LOSS OF SECONDARY
RESTRAINT CONCURRENT WITH THE PRIMARY RESULTS IN GROSS LOSS OF
PRESSURE INTEGRITY AND CREWPERSON LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-159
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT BRACKET REAR PIN
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
B [ F ] C [ F ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT/FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE PIN WILL CAUSE EFFECTIVE LOSS OF THE PRIMARY AXIAL
RESTRAINT AND RESULT IN THE SECONDARY RESTRAINT BEING REQUIRED TO
SUSTAIN SUIT LOADS. IF THE SECONDARY RESTRAINT BRACKET TO ALSO
FAIL, THE CREWPERSON WOULD BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-160
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LOSS OF REAR RESTRAINT BRACKET SCREW
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT/FRACTURE, SCREW
STRIPPED/BACKS OUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PIN SET SCREW WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF PRIMARY RESTRAINT
BUT SECONDARY RESTRAINT STILL HELD BY BRACKET. HOWEVER, IF THE
BRACKET ITSELF LOST TWO SIDE SCREWS, BOTH RESTRAINT COULD BE LOST
AS COULD THE CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9698-08
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE TETHER BRACKET TO MAINTAIN THE CONNECTION OF THE
EVA CREWPERSON TO THE SHUTTLE CAN RESULT IN UNCONTROLLED
CREWPERSON SEPARATION AND LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-162
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
LOSS OF HIP JOINT RING
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: IMPACT, DEFECTIVE MATERIAL, FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE OF THE HIP JOINT RING WILL RESULT IN PARTIAL TO TOTAL
LOSS OF THE PRIMARY AXIAL RESTRAINT FOR THE HIP AREA WITH LOAD
DEPENDENCE TRANSFERRED TO THE SECONDARY RESTRAINT. IF THE
SECONDARY RESTRAINT WERE ALSO LOST, SUIT LOADS COULD RESULT IN
GROSS
FAILURE OF SUIT PRESSURE INTEGRITY AND CREWPERSON LOSS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
CROTCH BUCKLE YIELDS/FRACTURES
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY LOAD RESTRAINT FOR CROTCH AREA TRANSFERS LOADS TO
SECONDARY RESTRAINT. IF SECONDARY RESTRAINT ALSO FAILS,
CREWPERSON CAN BE LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LOWER TORSO RESTRAINT BLADDER ASSEMBLY
WEBBING DETACHES FROM KEEPER RING
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0104-82335-22
CAUSES: FABRIC TORN/WORN, THREAD BREAKS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE WEBBING DETACHES FROM THE KEEPER RING, MINOR DEFORMATION
OF THE LTA CAN RESULT. BECAUSE THE DEFORMATION WOULD BE MINOR,
MOBILITY SHOULD NOT BE SEVERELY RESTRICTED NOR SHOULD CREWPERSON
DISCOMFORT BE A FACTOR. NO IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT































A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THREAD DEFECTIVE/TORN, MATERIAL DEFECT/WEAR/TEAR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO USE POCKET FOR RETENTION OF EVA SCISSORS SHOULD NOT
IMPACT MISSION OR CREWPERSON.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-166
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAIL ENGAGED TO LTA
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9857/9858
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MISSION AND THE CREWPERSON WILL NOT BE IMPACTED DUE TO THE
PRESENCE OF DONNING AID HANDLES.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9672-01
c [ ]
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECTIVE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIFFICULTY IN READING DCM DISPLAY AND CONTROLS. POSSIBLE
IRRITATION TO CREWPERSON DUE TO "FREE" LENS IN HELMET. MISSION
TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-168
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0106-85894-11/12
CAUSES: IMPACT, MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GIMBAL RING IS CRITICAL TO SUSTAINING GLOVE LOADS. IF LOST,
THE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE GLOVE ASSEMBLY WILL ALSO BE LOST IN
AN UNCONTROLLABLE MANNER RESULTING IN LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-169
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 0107-82968-07
CAUSES: FABRIC DEFECT/WEAR, MECHANICAL SEPARATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A DETACHED ZIPPER CAN RESULT IN POOR LCVG FIT AND THEREFORE




REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-170
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REDUCED OR IMPAIRED VISION WILL RESULT IN MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









EYE SHADES JAMMED/STUCK IN ONE POSITION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
















REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: IMPACT, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO EMPLOY EYESHADES DURING A MISSION WHICH REQUIRES
THEM CAN RESULT IN SIGNIFICANTLY IMPAIRED VISION AND MISSION
IMPACTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-172
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: A/L 9813-12
CAUSES: MATERIAL DEFECT/FATIGUE, IMPACT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A FAILURE CAN HAVE ONE OF TWO CONSEQUENCES: I) A LOOSE EVVA NOT
HELD IN POSITION, OR 2) STICKS THE EVVA IN ONE POSITION. THE
LATTER CONSEQUENCE IS THE MOST CRITICAL IN THAT MISSION
TERMINATION CAN RESULT IF THE EVVA CANNOT BE EMPLOYED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 02/25/88 E-173

APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment




Blank The IOA and the NASA are in agreement.
1 The IOA recommends inclusion of this failure mode
into the NASA FMEA.
2 The IOA recommends inclusion of this fialure mode
into the NASA CIL.
3 The IOA recommends deletion of the failure mode
from the IOA analysis.
4 The IOA recommends incorporation of the identified
failure mode as a "cause" into a specific NASA FMEA.
5 The IOA recommends downgrading the NASA FMEA
criticality.
6 The IOA recommends upgrading the NASA FMEA
criticality.
7 The IOA recommends upgrading the NASA FMEA
criticality and adding the failure mode to the CIL.
8 The IOA recommends removal of the NASA failure
mode from the CIL.
9 The IOA agrees with the NASA analysis.
i0 The IOA recommends a change to a screen.
ii The IOA recommends the failure mode be removed
from the NASA FMEA. Analysis of this event is
more applicable to a hazard analysis.
12 The IOA recommends the NASA failure mode effects
to be modified.
13 The EVC should be covered by the communications
and tracking reports by the IOA.
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